Fate has made me the “money guy” for OpenSSL so I’m going to talk about that for a bit. As has been well reported in the news of late, the OpenSSL Software Foundation (OSF) is a legal entity created to hustle money in support of OpenSSL. By “hustle” I mean exactly that: raising revenue by […]
Also filed in
|
|
In addition to the problems with Dual EC DRBG that have now been well documented[1], it is apparent to many of us in the clear bright light of the Snowden revelations that quite a few things that were previously dismissed as mere ineptitude or accident may in fact be aspects of a carefully planned and […]
Also filed in
|
|
I’m on record as stating that FIPS 140-2 validated software is necessarily less secure than its equivalent unvalidated implementation, all other things being equal. There are several factors conspiring to force this unfortunate outcome: 1) Exposure: the culture of non-disclosure and non-transparency in the CMVP means that only a handful of people ever even have […]
Also filed in
|
|
After several years of dealing with huge unwieldy CRL files DoD finally stands up a OCSP server, and after months pass it is more or less usable for awhile. Then I noticed the OCSP responses were being signed by an expired certificate (for unknown reasons DoD decided to use self-signed responder certificates). Here’s a typical […]
Also filed in
|
|
So, several years after first implementing the use of client and server x.509 certificates, DoD finally stands up an OCSP service. Good thing, because the relevant CRL files total over 200 megabytes, with some of them having a lifetime as brief as 18 hours. But, they had to do it a little differently. For starters […]
Also filed in
|
|
Like other comparable products Firefox and Thunderbird ship with a wide assortment of pre-installed CA certificates. Not only the usual ones from Verisign, Equifax, and the like but also ones from some obscure entities like “Staat der Nederlanden”, “”Camerfirma Chambers of Commerce”, “TURKTRUST Certificate Services”. The DoD PKI policy mandates that CA trusted keystores should […]
Also filed in
|
|
(Updated 2015-12-11) All of my clients seeking FIPS 140-2 validations are concerned about schedule. The elapsed time to the final validation award is usually more important than cost. The biggest element of that timeline is the long hiatus between the test report submission by the test lab to the CMVP, and the time […]
Also filed in
|
|