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DoD PKI and the Beat of a Different Drummer, Part 2

After several years of dealing with huge unwieldy CRL files DoD finally stands up a OCSP server, and after months pass it is more or less usable for awhile. Then I noticed the OCSP responses were being signed by an expired certificate (for unknown reasons DoD decided to use self-signed responder certificates). Here’s a typical query using a revoked certificate:

$ openssl ocsp -issuer ca.DOD_CA-13.pem -cert -url -resp_text -VAfile ca.dod_ocsp_ss.pem
OCSP Response Data:
OCSP Response Status: successful (0×0)
Response Type: Basic OCSP Response

Response verify OK revoked
This Update: May 3 23:00:00 2009 GMT
Next Update: May 10 07:00:00 2009 GMT
Revocation Time: Feb 21 13:53:33 2008 GMT
Note the CA certificate used for verification, ca.dod_ocsp_ss.pem. It expired nearly a year ago:
$ openssl x509 -noout -enddate -in ca.dod_ocsp_ss.pem
notAfter=Jun 22 19:26:25 2008 GMT
$ date
Mon May 4 08:45:07 EDT 2009

Unfortunately Apache mod_ssl doesn’t care for expired responder certs, so I wrote a patch to add a SSLOCSPResponderNoCertVerify configuration option to suppress the responder certificate validity check.

Opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of Veridical Systems, OpenSSL, DoD, the author's evil twin Skippy, or anyone else possibly including the author himself.